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page 183, however, her view has changed: she informs us that the 
Court, "like other governmental institutions has been uncertain 
about the direction family policy should take." So as a project in 
self-education Professor Rubin's book is a great success. As an ex-
ercise in coherent scholarship it is not. 
THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: 
THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888. By David P. 
Currie.t Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1985. Pp. 
xiii, 504. $55.00. 
Charles A. Lofgren 2 
Constitutional specialists who are not lawyers sometimes apply 
the term "law office history" to the selective and distorted probing 
of the past that occasionally passes as legal argument. The late 
Alfred Kelly once chose the apt title Clio and the Court: An Illicit 
Love Affair for a dissection of some notable examples of this kind of 
endeavor;3 and many of us have had fun straightening the historical 
excursions of judges. 
There is, however, a more laudable kind of lawyers' history, 
which Professor David Currie's large book exemplifies. Professor 
Currie has written what he calls a "critical history." "My search," 
he explains, "is for methods of constitutional analysis, for tech-
niques of opinion writing, for the quality of the performances of the 
Court and of its members." The result, according to the dust 
jacket, is a study that "analyz[es] the Court's constitutional work 
from a modern lawyer's point of view." This latter claim, I suspect, 
is only partly true, and as history the book has faults; but no one 
can deny that Currie has given us a thorough, systematic, and care-
ful assessment of the constitutional work of the Supreme Court dur-
ing the period 1789-1888. 
Currie's subject matter is the thousand or so cases of constitu-
tional significance during the Court's first century. The organiza-
tion is conventional, by each Chief Justice's "Court," except that 
the tenures of John Jay and Oliver Ellsworth (1789-1801) are 
grouped together. This first period receives fifty-five pages of cover-
I. Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. 
2. Roy P. Crocker Professor of American Politics and History, Claremont McKenna 
College. 
3. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 119. See 
generally C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY (1969). 
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age; Marshall's tenure, 137 pages; Taney's, eighty; Chase's, seventy-
three; and Waite's, ninety-one. Within each of the book's five parts, 
topical chapters variously explore jurisdictional decisions, boundary 
issues (separation-of-powers and federalism), and cases on the pow-
ers and limitations associated with specific doctrines, clauses, and 
amendments (including natural law, the contract and commerce 
clauses, and the fifth and Civil War amendments). The section on 
the Chase Court has a separate chapter on problems growing out of 
the Civil War and Reconstruction. 
In the process, nearly all of the major cases receive anywhere 
from a paragraph to ten pages of discussion. Some less familiar de-
cisions also get extended attention. (How many readers recall 
Mossman v. Higginson, or Louisiana v. Jumel?) In places, indeed, 
more obscure decisions vie for emphasis with the famous ones. But-
ler v. Pennsylvania gets as much space-two pages-as the Charles 
River Bridge case. But Currie would argue, I imagine, that fame is 
a poor guide to the real importance of a case; and an important 
virtue of the book is its analysis of the jurisdictional cases (espe-
cially the early ones) that were key to the Court's other work and 
are typically neglected, at least by non-specialists. In total, about 
135 cases are discussed at length, with the rest of the thousand re-
ceiving passing mention in either the text or footnotes. 
I am not troubled by Currie's criteria for evaluating the 
Court's performance, though they may sound rather old-fashioned 
to some scholars. He belongs, more or less, within the "reasoned 
elaboration" school of academic lawyers that emerged after World 
War II, whose views were expressed in the works of such thinkers 
as Herbert Wechsler. The ultimate source of the Court's power be-
ing the Constitution, says Currie, judges are bound by it and hence 
must respect its grants to other branches as well as the limitations it 
establishes. "[T]he judges have no more right to invent limitations 
not found in the Constitution than to disregard those put there by 
the Framers," he asserts, for "when a judge swears to uphold the 
Constitution, he promises obedience to a set of rules laid down by 
someone else." Although the text and original intent do not settle 
everything, where they provide ascertainable guidance judges may 
not legitimately substitute their own predilections. "Beyond this," 
he writes, "I share the conventional views that judges have an obli-
gation to explain the reasons for their decisions as concisely and 
persuasively as practicable, and that they should strive for consis-
tency, reserving the right to correct egregious and important errors 
on relatively rare occasions." 
Accordingly, the bulk of Currie's account consists of answers 
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to such questions as: Were the reasoning of the opinion and the 
outcome of the case consistent with earlier statements and out-
comes? Did the judges adequately explain themselves? Did they 
display intellectual curiosity? Were they faithful to the constitu-
tional text? Did they follow the original intention where it is clear? 
Currie's answers to these questions are hard to fault, particularly 
because he is willing to admit the close calls. (His treatment of the 
race-related cases arising under the Reconstruction amendments is 
especially even-handed.) 
The very strength of the book-its superb analysis of opin-
ions-creates several weaknesses. The larger environment of the 
period scarcely enters the picture; the cases, discussed seriatim de-
spite being topically grouped, are repeatedly introduced with only 
the barest statements of legally relevant facts. By the time Marbury 
appears, for example, the reader is familiar enough with the Court's 
(often-ignored) prior encounters with judicial review, but has little 
sense of what gave the case its contemporary political significance. 
Elsewhere, Currie effectively challenges common interpretations of 
Luther v. Borden as embodying the political question doctrine, but 
reduces the charged social-political atmosphere of Rhode Island in 
the 1830's and 1840's into this juiceless passage: 
Sued in a federal diversity case for breaking into Luther's house, Borden defended 
on the ground that he had been carrying out orders of the Rhode Island govern-
ment to suppress rebellion. Luther responded that the government for which Bor-
den acted no longer was the legitimate government of Rhode Island. 
We learn that Hall v. DeCuir involved "a law forbidding racial seg-
regation in public conveyances," but are told nothing about the rich 
insights it offers into Louisiana's fluid postbellum system of race 
relations.4 Although the Civil Rights Cases emerge as "famous," 
Currie does not discuss whether, all things considered, they much 
affected the course of people's lives.s And so forth-on and on and 
on. 
Discussions of specific Justices are similarly limited. The 
4. Glimpses emerge in the majority and dissenting opinions in DeCuir v. Benson, 27 
La. Ann. I (1875), but for the real treasure-trove, see the lengthy testimony in the trial pro-
ceedings, available in the case file for id., Case No. 4829, Louisiana Supreme Court Archives, 
Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans, and mostly reproduced in the Record 
submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court in Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878) which is available 
on microfilm. 
5. It is at least arguable, for example, that an opposite outcome in the cases-that is, 
validation of the Civil Rights Act of 1875-would not have posed a barrier to transportation 
segregation either under the common law of common carriers or pursuant to state legislation, 
so long as carrien observed the equal-but-separate formula. See C. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY 
CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION ch. 6, "The Transportation Law Environ-
ment: Access by Leave, Not Right" (forthcoming, Oxford University Press, 1987). 
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judges produce legal logic (or fail to do so), but one might gather 
they were born from jurisprudential wombs, some the happy issue 
of unions of logic and precedent, others congenitally given to "con-
clusory" argument (to use one of Currie's favorite pejorative terms), 
opaqueness, and inconsistency. 6 
To be sure, meeting these objections would have required a dif-
ferent (and even longer) book than the one Professor Currie evi-
dently set out to write. Then too, his footnotes refer the interested 
reader to sources that do address such contextual issues. Still, good 
history engages the reader, and I suspect that many "modern law-
yers," not to mention ordinary mortals, would have their interest 
better whetted-and their understanding of the cases better 
served-had Currie translated his obvious command of the relevant 
literature into a less disembodied account. 
Less defensible, or at least more surprising, is another omis-
sion. Besides slighting its historical context and significance, Currie 
largely fails to relate the Court's work to the broader legal environ-
ment, to the law as delineated especially by members of what very 
loosely may be called the Hurstian school of legal history.7 
Here let one example suffice. Currie is clearly correct in chal-
lenging the all-too-common notion that in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century the Court employed the fourteenth amendment 
to strike down state police measures in a wholesale fashion, but the 
reader gets little sense of the overall growth of regulation in the 
period and its acceptance by other courts. With antebellum origins 
that were far more extensive than the utterances on the subject by 
the Marshall and Taney Courts, the police power was an increas-
ingly pervasive legal reality by the 1880's as state authorities at-
tempted to cope with a variety of perceived social ills.s Precisely 
because Currie takes legal arguments so seriously and analyzes 
6. For a contrasting approach, see, e.g., G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRA-
DITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES (1976). 
7. For an overview and critique of Professor Hurst's own work, see, e.g., Gordon, J. 
Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in American Legal Historiography, 10 L. & 
Soc. REV. 9 (1975); Scheiber, At the Borderland of Law and Economic History: The Contri-
butions of Willard Hurst, 75 AM. HIST. REV. 744 (1970); and for an indication of who and 
what might be included within a very loosely defined Hurstian school of legal history, see 
Scheiber, American Constitutional History and the New Legal History: Complementary 
Themes in Two Modes, 68 J. OF AM. HIST. 337 (1981). Probably all attempts to fashion labels 
for historical schools are doomed to failure, and I would prefer not to have to defend rigor-
ously the application of "Hurstian" to a group in which I would include both Scheiber and 
Morton J. Horwitz. Scheiber's term, the "New Legal History," is broader, but "new" histo-
ries keep succeeding one another, with no little confusion about what the label means. 
8. See, e.g., M. KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY AMERICA, 343-472 (1977). For a sweeping early review of judicial encounters 
with the police power, see Hastings, The Development of Law as Illustrated by the Decisions 
Relating to the Police Power of the State, 39 PROC. OF THE AMER. PHIL. Soc. 359 (1900). 
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them so masterfully, he could have effectively shown the place of 
the Supreme Court in the broader web of doctrinal tension between 
"public rights" and the "rule of law," to use Harry N. Scheiber's 
formulation.9 Substantial footnote references aside, however, Cur-
rie gives us little beyond an internal analysis of Supreme Court 
opinions and hence misses a splendid opportunity to examine the 
relation of doctrinal debates to the policy goals embodied in and 
fostered by the period's legal order. 10 
As a historian, I am also troubled by the anachronisms that so 
frequently appear as Currie indicates how future cases elaborated, 
contested, or resolved points incompletely or unsatisfactorily han-
dled in the case immediately under discussion. If the instances of 
this technique are not literally countless, there are more of them 
than I would care to count, and the result is not always illuminat-
ing. In the course of Currie's discussion of McCulloch v. Maryland, 
for example, we read, "Though much sweat is often shed over gen-
eral principles, as it was in McCulloch, it is not news that they sel-
dom decide actual cases," at which point footnote 40 appears and 
takes this form: "See, e.g., Associated Indus. v. Department of La-
bor, 487 F.2d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 1973) (doubting whether it made 
any practical difference whether regulations of the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration were reviewed under the 'arbi-
trary and capricious' standard or the 'substantial evidence' rule). 
See also . ... " Though a lawyerly footnote, this does not, I submit, 
9. Scheiber, Public Rights and the Rule of Law in American Legal History, 72 CALIF. 
L. REV. 217 (1984). 
10. A particularly good occasion might have been the discussion of Mugler v. Kansas, 
123 U.S. 623 (1887), and Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888). See D. CURRIE, THE 
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888, 375-78 
(1985). Justice Harlan wrote the Court's opinion in each case, upholding a prohibition on the 
manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages in Mugler and on the manufacture and sale of 
oleomargarine in Powell. Currie correctly notes that the Mugler opinion appears to admit 
that there were some fourteenth amendment limits to the police power, while in Powell 
Harlan ignored the hint. If anything, it can be argued that on the face of his opinion in 
Mugler, Harlan more boldly tried to have it both ways, despite the pro-regulation gloss he 
soon placed on Mugler in Powell. But did contemporaries read the opinions in this fashion? 
Looking for background to police power-due process cases at the state level would help give a 
sense of the extent to which lawmakers and lawyers of the period saw Mugler and Powell as 
embodying conflicting notions of legal empowerrnents and limits and of how they related the 
cases to legislative policy goals at the state level. Also, I suspect, the state cases would help 
clarify why analysis of the police power entered into discussions of the due process limitations 
of the fourteenth amendment, and thus help resolve why "the Court's own opinions began to 
speak in ... police-power terms [as advanced in earlier dissents by Justice Field] without even 
explaining what they had to do with the fourteenth amendment." D. CURRIE, supra, at 375 
(footnote omitted). I offer some related comments on the fourteenth amendment and the 
police power during the period in C. Lofgren, supra note 5, ch. 4, "The Constitutional Envi-
ronment: Lost Origins and Judicial Deference." 
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take us very far in understanding the Bank Case as an event in the 
year 1819. 
Similarly, in the midst of a careful analysis of Roger Taney's 
opinion in Dred Scott, after noting Taney's use of the fifth amend-
ment's due process clause, Currie remarks that "even the threshold 
question whether the amendments applied to the territories was dis-
putable: fifty years later the Court would hold that some of them 
did not apply to certain other possessions .... "II Or consider 
Currie's remark in his discussion of the relatively obscure case of 
Woodruff v. Parham, in which the Court, speaking through Justice 
Miller, upheld a tax on goods sold at auction, even though they had 
come from other states and were sold in their original packages. 
The tax, Miller stressed, was non-discriminatory and to invalidate it 
would be to impose discriminatory burdens on local manufacturers. 
"All of this must strike a responsive chord in the modern reader," 
writes Currie, "for much of what Miller said about the commerce 
clause in Woodruff has survived: discrimination is almost always 
contrary to the clause, but interstate commerce may be required to 
pay its way." The footnotes cite twentieth century cases. Such stuff 
is interesting and most historians (including me) have done the 
same thing from time to time. But it is not exactly history. 
Some readers may lodge a further complaint: that application 
of Currie's criteria of judicial excellence to an earlier period is legiti-
mate only if it can be shown that the thoughtful lawyers of that 
period employed similar standards. Professor Currie could have 
tackled this issue more directly, but he does offer a defense of his 
approach, albeit implicitly. The judges, he repeatedly shows, taxed 
each other for their argumentative lapses, and the best of them re-
flected on their enterprise. 
In particular, Joseph Story and Benjamin R. Curtis shine forth 
in this respect. If overshadowed in the usual accounts by John 
Marshall, whose talents Currie by no means belittles, Story avoided 
the great Chief Justice's bad habitsl2 and gave us this "simple state-
ment of the proper approach to constitutional interpretation": 
And, perhaps, the safest rule of interpretation, after all, will be found to look to the 
nature and objects of the particular powers, duties and rights, with all the lights and 
aids of contemporary history; and to give to the words of each just such operation 
II. In fairness, Currie goes on to remark that prior to Dred Scott the Court had also 
limited the application of the Constitution in the territories. But the pervasiveness of anach-
ronistic references is suggested further by the fact that the sentence preceding the one quoted 
in the text refers to both Lochner v. New York and Roe v. Wade. See D. CURRIE, supra note 
10, at 271-72. 
12. "[I]t is difficult to find a single Marshall opinion that puts together the relevant 
legal arguments in a convincing way." D. CURRIE, supra note 10, at 197. 
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and force, consistent with their legitimate meanings, as may fairly secure and attain 
the ends proposed. 13 
Curtis, although serving on the Court for only six years, dis-
played "awesome analytic powers" and in his Dred Scott dissent-
"one of the great masterpieces of constitutional opinion-writing"-
"delivered a classic statement on constitutional interpretation": 
[W]hen a strict interpetation of the Constitution, according to the fixed rules which 
govern the interpretation of laws, is abandoned, and the theoretical opinions of indi-
viduals are allowed to control its meaning, we have no longer a Constitution; we are 
under the government of individual men, who for the time being have power to 
declare what the Constitution is, according to their own views of what it ought to 
mean.l4 
(Not so incidentally, the leading student of Dred Scott describes 
Curtis as a "sound constitutional conservative ... , following estab-
lished precedent along a well-beaten path to [his] conclusions."). Is 
The comments from Story and Curtis prompt a final question. 
It is one thing for Currie to seek original understandings. For all 
the sophisticated debate over the issue, there remains considerable 
force to the notion that the Constitution's provisions (and amend-
ments) should mean what they originally meant if the document is 
indeed a law that is binding on transient lawmakers and judges. 
For purposes of my final question, at least, the point can be ac-
cepted arguendo. But why focus on the Philadelphia Convention as 
a source of authoritative original meaning? Like so many others, 
Currie here and there searches its records to determine whether his 
judges were true to the Constitution.I6 But by its own terms, the 
Constitution gains its force from the ratification process.11 Its truly 
authoritative original meaning was the one given it by the people 
who took part in the ratification proceedings. These people by and 
13. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 610-11 (1842). 
14. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 621 (1857). 
15. D. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED ScOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN 
LAW AND POLITICS 414 (1978). Currie might have made his point even more forcefully by 
quoting more of the paragraph by Curtis. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 
620-21 (1857). 
16. The hold of "framer intent" is suggested by Currie's remarks in the course of dis-
cussing the Court's refusal, in 1793, to give the president an advisory opinion: 
Today we might shore up these conclusions [of the Justices] by reference to the 
debates in the constitutional convention. . . . The official journal of the convention, 
however, was withheld from public scrutiny until 1819, and Madison's notes were 
unavailable until after his death in 1836. Thus the Justices were deprived of a valu-
able aid to construction during the critical formative years. 
D. CURRIE, supra note 10, at 12-13 (footnotes omitted). Accord, Currie's comment on the 
Prize Cases, quoted in note 18, infra. 
17. U.S. Const. art. VII. Currie quotes and cites comments from the ratification de-
bates, but without according them any precedence as authority. See, e.g., D. CURRIE, supra 
note 10, at 44 n.96, 70 n.42. 
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large were unfamiliar with the maneuvers and successive proposals 
and votes in the Philadelphia Convention. For this reason, it seems 
inappropriate to read the Constitution in light of the Convention's 
proceedings. Consider, for example, the meaning commonly wrung 
out of the fate of a council of revision apropos advisory opinions 
and judicial activism, or out of the change in the wording of Con-
gress's war powers (as a support for presidential authority). Most 
of the ratifiers could not have been swayed in their understanding of 
the Constitution by either of these bits of legislative history from the 
Convention, for the simple reason that they were unaware of them. 
Nor did the attempts within the Convention to define ex post facto 
laws and direct taxes and to explain the contract clause determine 
the understandings people had of the pertinent provisions of the fin-
ished document when it was before the ratifying conventions. (I 
select these examples because they appear in Currie's account.)Is 
The priority of ratifiers over framers is inherent not only in the 
logic of the matter but also in contemporary comments. In Penn-
sylvania, James Wilson remarked: 
[T]he late Convention have done nothing beyond their powers. The fact is, they 
have exercised no power at all. And in point of validity, this Constitution, proposed 
by them for the government of the United States, claims no more than a production 
of the same nature would claim, flowing from a private pen. It is laid before the 
citizens of the United States, unfettered by restraint; it is laid before them to be 
judged by the natural, civil, and political rights of men. By their FIAT, it will 
become of value and authority; without it, it will never receive the character of 
authenticity and power.19 
Madison said the same thing in The Federalist Papers (themselves a 
product of the ratification process),2o and he explained the priority 
of the ratifiers over the framers more directly several years later: 
As the instrument came from them [the members of the Philadelphia Convention] it 
18. D. CURRIE, supra note 10, at 12-13 (advisory opinions), 36 & n.40 (direct taxes), 44 
& n.96 (ex post facto laws); 70 & n.42 (judicial review), 135 (obligation of contracts), 274 
(presidential war-making authority). Currie admits that with respect to the meaning of direct 
taxes, ex post facto laws, and the contract clause, the Convention debates are not illuminat-
ing. That he would rest considerable weight on them if they were more informative is sug-
gested by his remarks on advisory opinions, quoted in note 16 supra, as well as this comment 
about the Prize Cases: "[Justice] Grier neglected to cite the Convention history that would 
have placed his conclusion beyond dispute: the original draft empowering Congress to 'make' 
war was altered to the present form on Madison's and Gerry's motion, 'leaving to the Execu-
tive the power to repel sudden attacks.'" D. CURRIE, supra note 10, at 274 (footnote omit-
ted). Indeed, whether the Convention debates on the point are themselves quite so clear in 
meaning is debatable. See Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Un-
derstanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672, 675-77 (1972). 
19. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CoNSTITUTION 
[Ratification of the Constitution by the States: Pennsylvania] 483-84 (M. Jensen ed. 1976) 
(Wilson's speech in the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, Dec. 4, 1787). 
20. See THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 263-66 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
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was nothing more than the draft of a plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life and 
validity were breathed into it by the voice of the people, speaking through the sev-
eral State Conventions. If we were to look, therefore, for the meaning of the instru-
ment beyond the face of the instrument, we must look for it, not in the General 
Convention, which proposed, but in the State Conventions, which accepted and 
ratified the Constitution. 21 
185 
No wonder Justice Story later spoke of using "all the lights and aids 
of contemporary history." 
But this makes the process of deciphering original intent a 
more difficult business, and a rather more interesting one, not only 
because it requires a much larger corpus of directly related records, 
but also because it involves complicated problems in the legal-intel-
lectual history of an age.22 I shall not hold my breath, however, 
until the day Convention history ceases to be the usual guide. Cer-
tainly Currie, in turning to the framers, has not violated the schol-
arly custom. 
As these comments suggest, Professor Currie's book does not 
do everything. But what it does, it does exceptionally well. As a 
reference work for constitutional teachers, it is a gold mine. 
21. 5 ANNALS OF CoNGRESS, col. 776 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (Madison's speech in the 
House of Representatives, April 6, 1796). Cf Powell, The Original Understanding of Origi-
nal Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885,935-41 (1985). Professor Powell agrees that Madison gave 
priority to the ratifiers over the framers, but argues that Madison's dominant approach to 
constitutional interpretation, in common with that of most of his contemporaries, was not 
intent-based in our sense of the term-that is, as signifying what the framers and ratifiers 
themselves intended. Powell claims instead that to the extent Madison and his contemporar-
ies discussed intent, it was primarily intent based on inferences from the Constitution itself, 
from the document's expressed purpose, and perhaps from the general conditions to which it 
was a response. (In this inferential sense, "intent" becomes in our terms a kind of construc-
tive intent rather than a historical reconstruction from legislative history.) I have not ex-
amined all of the evidence Professor Powell reviews in his important article, but in checking 
his sources relating to Madison's understanding of the use of intent, as well as those from the 
1796 debate in the House of Representatives over proper methods of constitutional interpre-
tation (which accompanied the debate over House access to executive documents bearing on 
the Jay Treaty), I note several instances in which, as I read the evidence, Powell does either 
or both of two things. One approach he takes is to interpret attacks on use of the proceedings 
of the Philadelphia Convention as attacks on use of intent as reconstructed from the ratifica-
tion proceedings and their context. The other is to minimize the force of comments that 
endorse use of the latter sort of intent. However, this gets to matters too distant from Cur-
rie's book to pursue here. 
22. For an example of the learning that needs go into the enterprise, see F. McDoN-
ALD, NOVUS 0RDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(1985). Professor McDonald's study does not extend to a systematic reading of the Constitu-
tion as the ratifiers would have understood it, but it dips into the issue of how they viewed the 
contract clause. See id. at 274-75. 
